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Dialectical Inquiry: 
A Structured Qualitative Research Method 
 
Eli Berniker and David E. McNabb 
Pacific Lutheran University Tacoma, Washington 
 
 
This paper presents Dialectical Inquiry (DI) as a structured qualitative 
research method for studying participant models of organizational 
processes. The method is applied to rich secondary anecdotal data on 
technology transfer, gathered by subject-matter experts in a large firm. DI 
assumes that the imposition of a dialectical structure will produce 
emergent theories in tacit use by organizational actors. As such, it serves 
as a meta-structure for grounded research. Three competing models were 
discovered in the data. Each model was analyzed in the context of other 
models to reveal governing assumptions and counter assumptions. It is 
demonstrated that each model grasps essential truths, but is necessarily 
incomplete, and would fail due to internal contradictions. The internal and 
external validity of the results were tested in a manner consistent with 
qualitative research. Key Words: Technology Transfer, Dialectic, 
Organizational Sensemaking, and Metastructure 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present and exemplify Dialectical Inquiry (DI) as a 
useful structured qualitative research method for studying organizational sense making 
processes as they are understood by participants. The paper will develop DI as a research 
method and link it to other qualitative methodologies. The particular research setting and 
challenges will be described. In this particular case, the challenge was to understand 
internal processes of technology transfer. Subject matter experts in the organization 
conducted interviews and experienced great difficulty interpreting their data. The 
research challenge was to “make sense” of this secondary data (McNabb, 2004).          
The research process will be described and exemplified with data from the case.         
The findings will be presented as they emerged in the research process within an imposed 
dialectical framework. At critical points, we will pause to reflect upon the method.         
Tests of internal and external validity are presented as well as conclusions from the 
research. It is hoped that the relationship between emerging findings, the imposed 
dialectical framework, and the process will demonstrate the advantages of DI as a 
qualitative research method. 
The first author was engaged in executing the research. The second author 
reviewed the research, contributed the literature review, and structured much of the 
paper. He was not directly involved with the company research process. He had the 
foresight to insist that the work be published. 
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Organizational Sense Making 
 
Organizational sense making presents a challenge to the researcher. Gareth 
Morgan (1986) has classified the multiple models, metaphors, and constructs we impose 
on organizational phenomena in our efforts to gain valid scientific understandings.         
Taken together, our models and theories are inconsistent, incommensurate, and 
paradoxical. They seek to answer the question, “How are we to understand, as scientists, 
organizational phenomena?” A related question is to ask how organizational actors 
understand the same phenomena. Kaplan (1964) argues that we must distinguish between 
the meaning of an act to the actor and it’s meaning to scientists taking that act as subject 
matter. We presume that those understandings are similar, but that is only a presumption.         
“Observational data have no more validity than attaches to that presumption” (Kaplan, 
139). That suggests that the relationship between our models and theories, and those in 
use by organizational actors, are problematic. We should not impose our constructs as 
valid representations of the understandings of organizational actors. 
Managerial understandings about organizational functioning must make sense, 
even if such functioning appears unreasonable and irrational at times. There must be 
"method to the madness." Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1968, pp.16-17) assumes as 
much, referring to "the availability…of common sense knowledge of...society" or to "the 
grasp of what were…adequate methods for dealing with…matters.” Sensibility, thus, 
implies theory building. There must be a model, or models, that grant structure to 
experience, and reduce equivocality by distilling events into recognizable patterns. 
Discovery of such theories implies a grounded theory perspective (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) as opposed to the imposition of rational academic models.           
Purposeful actors whose actions are guided by their own particular understandings 
of the processes in which they participate constitute organizations. If we assume that 
actors have choices, their categories and meanings become necessary, complementary 
elements in a valid representation of those processes. Furthermore, those processes 
“make sense” to participants. They represent a more or less coherent representation of 
how their organizations function. However, most of this knowledge and understanding is 
tacit, communicated in anecdotes, narratives, and stories (Wilkins, 1989). It should be 
clear that the discovery and explication of tacit knowledge necessarily calls for 
qualitative research methods.          
The research opportunity sets up a strategic choice for the researcher. We can 
review the literature, accepted constructs and theories, and the various instruments 
available to measure and verify aspects of these models and theories. In effect, we would 
be imposing the understandings of researchers on to the experiences of organizational 
actors. Alternatively, we can assume that organizational actors are competent in their 
work, that is, that their successful functioning indicates effective theories of action. In 
that case, we cannot impose our constructs or instruments. We must search the qualitative 
content of narrations and interviews to discover meanings and theories-in-use. The 
constructs, to be measured, are not yet available. The assumption of purposefulness and 
competence requires, at this stage of the research, qualitative methods. 
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The Development of Dialectical Inquiry 
 
Our development of Dialectical Inquiry as a method of qualitative research 
derives from the work of C. West Churchman (1971), as further developed by R. O. 
Mason (1969). In his book, The Design of Inquiring Systems, Churchman compares 
several competing scientific approaches to testing the truth content of statements 
including those of Locke, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. The purpose was a philosophical 
analysis of a practical question, “Could a computer determine whether there was life on 
Mars?”  
The dialectic assumes that a thesis and its antithesis can be developed to explain 
any set of facts and data. This is a strong epistemological assumption. Conflicting models 
can emerge from facts and data, and both models have valid claims to truth. The conflicts 
derive from differing interpretative assumptions actors apply to facts and data 
(Churchman, 1971; Mason, 1969). Paul Feyerabend (1968) applies these principles to 
science, arguing that the relationship between theory and data is incestuous; theory 
defines what will be called data, and data, in turn, verifies the theory. Theories should be 
tested against radically antithetical theories. The point of the dialectic is to posit 
antithetical theories and models as a method of elucidating the assumptions underpinning 
those theories and models. 
Richard Mason (1969) used dialectical modeling to support decision making for a 
firm faced with two antithetical strategic plans for its future. There has been an extensive 
debate on its utility in support of effective decision-making (Cosier, 1981; Mitroff & 
Mason, 1981; Mitroff & Mason, 1982) in the pages of the Academy of Management 
Review. Given that our focus is on discovery, not decision-making, the benefits with 
respect to decision processes are not a concern. 
The dialectic is clearly a qualitative research method. Its focus is on the content 
and meaning of models and theories in use. As will be demonstrated in this research, the 
number of subjects evoking particular models of technology transfer is irrelevant to 
discovering their meaning. Indeed, one subject richly described all three models that 
emerged from the research. The significance of each model is its utility in understanding 
the alternative models.  
 
The Logic of Dialectical Discovery 
 
The focus on discovery forces us to abandon some of the assumptions noted in the 
above discussion. We cannot assume the availability of competing models; they must 
emerge from the data. Nor can we arbitrarily limit the number of competing models to 
two. In principle, there are no limits to the number of potential models. Nevertheless, 
Dialectical Inquiry does impose a structure on the qualitative research process. 
DI imposes a meta-theoretical framework on the research process. It parallels the 
efforts of others to better structure grounded theory methods, and reduces the “magical 
moments” that are needed to bridge between emergent theories and data (Carlson & 
McCaslin, 2003). DI makes the ontological assumption that organizational actors can 
operate on the basis of multiple implicit models. While the dialectic implies two models, 
grounded research principles suggest that we do not limit the number of models in use. 
That becomes an empirical question. Furthermore, DI assumes that such models, upon 
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analysis, will prove to be in conflict. This does not mean that decisions and processes are 
necessarily inconsistent or incoherent. Given that these models are tacit, organizational 
actors will be unaware of inconsistencies. Rather, the DI framework requires that 
emergent models be distilled so that underlying assumptions, counter assumptions, and 
contradictions become evident.  
The meta-theoretical framework imposed by DI is not about the content of 
managerial models, but their structure taken as a set. The point is that by juxtaposing tacit 
models within an imposed structure, their content and meaning will become evident. The 
logic of DI is an example of Sheffield’s (2004) notion of a philosophic method. A 
philosophical perspective is utilized explicitly to frame inquiry. 
These distinctions might be better grasped metaphorically. Imagine organizing 
processes as a shared fabric cognitive map of understandings overlaid in a multiplicity of 
patterns. As organizational history accumulates and evolves, much of that understanding 
becomes tacit. The map appears as a dense mass of meanings created by the folding over, 
under, and into of understandings and interpretations, a wadded ball without beginning or 
end. The logic of processes becomes obscure. Processes appear to work even if they are 
poorly understood. Rules of thumb evolve to guide actions encoded in anecdotes, stories, 
and myths (Wilkins, 1989). These may be understood as “scripts” (Gioia & Manz, 1985). 
According to Lord and Kernan (1987), scripts are the cognitive knowledge structures that 
are held in people’s memory. In this sense, scripts describe the sequencing of events in 
conventional or familiar situations. 
Scripts work whether they are well understood or not. Moreover, there is no 
requirement that scripts be consistent. In the case studied, this was the situation that 
confronted expert managers when they interviewed colleagues across their company.         
Anecdotal data revealed no apparent logic or pattern. There was nowhere to grasp the 
fabric in the ball; the map could not be read. 
DI can be used to identify and make explicit models that stretch out the fabric 
map and expose both patterns and interpretations. Imagine each model as a stake 
stretching its corner of the fabric, exposing part of the map. To achieve this stretching, 
each model must be distilled to an extreme formulation (i.e., to the point where it 
becomes almost dysfunctional). Practical scripts are composites of these extreme models.         
Thus, inconsistent models can become the basis for what appears as coherent purposeful 
action.          
 
The Method of Dialectical Inquiry 
 
The logical structure imposed by DI requires the researcher to identify competing 
models and explore them in depth. It must be emphasized that these models must emerge 
from respondents. They should not be controlled by the questions of the interviewer or by 
categories suggested by the interviewers. In this particular research, the interviewers were 
themselves unaware of technology transfer models. They asked respondents to explain 
how technology transfer worked from their experience. The results were anecdotes, 
narratives, and a variety of assertions. The record of these interviews was the data that we 
analyzed. 
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The method was to identify particular themes that seemed to be recurring across 
interviews. For example, someone claimed that you do not transfer technology. You get 
the expert. The theme is people. A second theme was about information. Once identified, 
it becomes possible to document the many instances when a theme is expressed across 
the interviews. Following the identification of common themes, each was defined as a 
model that excluded the others.          
Conceptual clarity allows the researcher to expose the assumptions that drive the 
model. Each model incorporates ontological assumptions about organizational 
functioning. Exclusive models suggest conflicting assumptions and counter assumptions, 
all of which expose the tacit understandings of how each model “works.” If we assume 
that each model represents some organizational truth and that they are in conflict, it 
follows that each is incomplete with respect to the truths of competing models. Forcing 
each model to its extreme stretches the fabric cognitive map, making it intelligible. 
It must be noted that the identified models are subject to whatever biases 
interviewers, interviewees, and researchers bring to bear. Alternative sets of models, in 
dialectical relationships, could also be postulated. We can assume that each model can be 
a basis for finer distinctions, and the exposure of other models collapsed under a single 
model. DI provides an initial map that is useful to practitioners and a point of departure 
for further research. 
Our purposes in this research, then, were to apply Dialectical Inquiry as a method 
of discovery of explicit models shared among competent professionals and managers in 
organizations, and to demonstrate the efficacy of DI as a qualitative research 
methodology. The methodological hypothesis is: The imposition of a dialectical structure 
will distill emergent theories in use by organizational actors that validly represent their 
tacit understandings. 
 
Discovery versus Imposition 
 
Discovery and imposition suggest conflicting modes of inquiry. The first implies 
“inquiry from the inside,” while the second implies a priori categories. (Evered & Lewis, 
1981). Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that theory should emerge from data. In this 
research we decided, a priori, that a dialectical pattern would be discovered in the 
interview data. Such believing should result in seeing what researchers expect (Weick, 
1979). Nevertheless, this application of DI seeks to bridge the conflict between these 
approaches.          
The content of organizational enactments of technology transfer is emergent (i.e., 
the product of interview data), while the form in which they are interpreted is dialectical.         
In essence, we are saying that while content may not be predictable, the relationship 
between various scripts, their conflicts, and contradictions are predictable. This 
imposition of dialectic order may be understood both epistemologically and 
ontologically. The former assumes that the dialectic structures our ways of knowing the 
world. The latter assumes that the world is necessarily dialectical and paradoxical.          
 
 
 
 
 
Eli Berniker and David E. McNabb 648 
The Research Setting 
 
ABC is a large aerospace firm with significant resources invested in research and 
development (R&D), and general dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of technology 
transfer (or infusion as they called it)1 between R&D units and project groups. An 
Engineering Management Quality Improvement Team (Management Team or 
interviewing team), made up of high-level engineers and engineering managers, was 
chartered by the company to investigate the poor rate of technology infusion. "Why isn't 
technology infusion more effective" was their concern. The problems appeared to span 
the entire company and appeared generic to the industry, given many years of public 
discussion of the issues. 
The Management Team interviewed 55 top engineering managers across the 
company in many geographical locations. Interviewees understood the charter of the 
Management Team. Individual team members asked interviewees to reflect upon their 
years of managerial experience, and explain how technology transfer works at ABC. 
Technology transfer obviously made sense to respondents, no matter how ineffective it 
was. Yet, the Management Team could not draw useful general conclusions from their 
highly anecdotal data. The Management Team’s report provided a rich and complex 
picture of technology transfer across the firm. Interviews between competent 
professionals with shared, but tacit, understandings did not yield a coherent model of 
technology transfer.          
This is a strange outcome for a group of experienced managers in dialog with 
expert colleagues. The norms of rationality and the presumption of logic should preclude 
such outcomes. It was to be expected that when managers assume the roles of 
practitioner-researchers, studying their own organizational processes, they would impose 
order on the data in a process of socially constructing a reasonable reality (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967). Chenail and Maione (1997) raise the question of how practitioner-
researchers conceptualize and “evaluate their qualitative research projects in light of their 
already knowing too much …without being totally overwhelmed by it.” Clearly, the ABC 
Management Team was overwhelmed by the data they collected.  
The ABC Management Team, subsequently, turned to the first author for help in 
“making sense of the data.” The challenge for the researcher was to explain to the team 
what they already knew. In other words, to discover patterns and meanings within the 
anecdotal data they had collected. At no point were the researchers in contact with any of 
the interviewees. Given that the researcher was not part of the interview process, the 
authors did not determine the conditions of the Management Team’s research. Given that 
the interviews were conducted between employees of a single firm, it is doubtful that any 
human subject protections were in place. Indeed, the identities of all of the interviewees 
were part of the published interview record. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1  Technology transfer and infusion may be differentiated as processes between organizations and within 
organizations respectively.  For this discussion, both are assigned a common label - technology transfer. 
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Technology Transfer 
 
Perhaps the outcome should not be surprising. The management of technology has 
become an area of increasing concern for government and industry, and an emerging 
domain of academic research. The rate of development and implementation of new 
technologies is seen as an indicator of industry competitiveness in international markets 
(Root, 1990), and the performance of research and development organizations is 
considered critical to competitive success (President's Commission on Industrial 
Competitiveness, 1985; Wheelwright, 1985). Considerable government resources are 
being devoted to R&D to support both defense and commercial technological 
development. Of particular concern have been the processes of technology transfer 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1990; Galbraith, Merrill, & Campbell, 1991). 
A characteristic of much research on the processes of technology transfer has 
been to take technology for granted, while studying organizational variables as 
determinants of the success or failure of technology transfer efforts. O'Connor, Parsons,         
Liden, and Herold (1990) suggest that “technology will readily cross boundaries,” while 
human resources practices are not easily transferable. Wilkof (1991) develops a socio-
technical analysis of a technological innovation that focuses almost entirely on 
organizational, social, and cultural factors. In a later paper O'Connor, Parsons and Liden 
(1992) argue for greater attention to attitudinal and behavioral responses to new 
technologies. The technology management literature is replete with many models of 
technology transfer (Ettlie, 1988; March & Sproull, 1990; Rubenstein, 1992), developed 
as extensions of more or less rational models of organizational processes. There is a 
tendency to impose academic models upon the phenomena, even at this necessarily 
preliminary stage of inquiry (Tornatzky, 1992). 
New technologies are equivocal, poorly understood (Weick, 1990), and 
necessarily incomplete (Berniker, 1991). Arguing they are transferable, but for 
organizational constraints, assumes away their uncertainties and shifts the focus towards 
attitudes, beliefs, and culture. Several questions are confounded in current research 
efforts on technology transfer. For example, “Are the issues technological, 
organizational, resistance to change, motivational, or cultural?” This study suggests that 
even when there are strong organizational and individual motives for the adoption and 
implementation of new technologies, and when such technology transfers are intra-
organizational among units within the same organization who enjoy proximity, 
technology transfer can be problematic.          
 
The Process of Dialectical Inquiry 
 
The focus of the research is on the underdeveloped “technology of technology 
transfer,” to use Tornatsky's (1992) perceptive term. Our research purpose was to develop 
models of technology transfer grounded in the experience of ABC’s managers (i.e., make 
their “technology of technology transfer” explicit). This process involved four distinct 
steps, each of which is discussed below. 
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Step 1: Identifying Scripts and Models 
 
Making sense of printed interview notes is necessarily a creative endeavor. The 
reconstructed logic of the dialectical presentation does not mirror sense-making as it 
unfolds. The research process required several readings for immersion, familiarity, and 
note taking. Script search commenced with the fourth reading to seek strong exclusive 
images that might typify models.  
We should differentiate three terms to make the research process more 
transparent. We see “themes” as a common thread of ideas that suggests a script. A script 
is a cognitive knowledge structure about how processes work in organizations (Lord & 
Kernan, 1987). Since scripts are poorly understood, we differentiate them from a 
“model.” The model is characterized by logical coherence (i.e., an understanding of how 
it works). Thus, the research process is to seek themes in the interview data, infer from 
these themes a shared script, and develop the implicit model by examining its underlying 
assumptions. Given that the framework is dialectical, we expect each of these models to 
contradict the others. 
Themes are first identified by a strong unequivocal assertion in the interview 
notes that purports to exclude alternative assertions. For example, “The best way to 
transfer technology is to transfer people.” Among the many lesser assertions and 
anecdotes, this assertion stands out as a potential theme. It suggests a strong script (Lord 
& Kernan, 1987). Taking this theme as a potential theme, the interviews were again 
reviewed seeking to find further similar statements. It quickly became apparent that many 
managers shared this view of technology transfer. People spoke of it in many ways. For 
examples, "People you know," "old boy contacts," "technology exists as good people," 
and "transfer of technology is essentially the transfer of people." The evidence of this 
theme could fill pages with quotes from the interviews. It was, by far, the most frequent 
of the technology transfer models discussed by the interviewed managers. This model, or 
script, was tentatively labeled the “people-mover model”. 
Once the first script had been verified with a plethora of quotations from the 
interviews, a similar search was conducted for a second model. The dialectic framework 
was used as a heuristic. Specifically, we sought a strong assertion that, in some way, 
excluded the first script. Did any interviewee deny the first theme? Again, a strong 
assertion triggered recognition of a potential second theme, “We need directives to force 
projects to… document…” Note that the subject is information. People are not 
mentioned, signaling an alternative theme. This theme was initially narrowly labeled the 
“documentation model”. However, further review of the interviews suggested a more 
inclusive label, the “communication model,” to include references to documentation, 
symposia, seminars, bulletins, databases, etc… The references to this model, less frequent 
than the “people-mover model” took many forms. Examples include, “We need more 
corporate memory,” “more communication,” “projects should be briefed,” and “total lack 
of documentation.” There were also many references to journals, updates, briefings, 
meetings, seminars, symposia, and the need for databases. This clearly qualified as an 
important and frequent theme in the interviews. 
The third model proved more elusive. The most frequent references were to the 
first two models. Furthermore, while DI implies at least two models, there is no 
requirement for more to emerge. Statements, that implicitly denied both these models, 
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yielded two more “scripts.” Examine the following statement: “For a technology to be 
ABC on-the-shelf, ABC must put it on the shelf.” There is no mention of people, 
communication, or documentation. A different theme is signaled here. We tentatively 
labeled this third theme the “on-the-shelf model.” 
The discovery of the “on-the-shelf model” required some reflection about the first 
two models. The first model was emphatically about people, while the second was clearly 
about information. The third had to relate to some other domain. It took some 
imagination to parse a set of quotes that seemed to suggest a similar script.         
Paraphrased, the following are examples. 
 
• Program requirements call for the utilization of a proven concept… 
implies the availability of appropriate specifications, allowables and 
design manual information . . .  
• Not enough data exists to assure low risk.  
• Risk avoidance [guides selection].  
• Allowables did not exist. 
• A need exists for rigorous and objective classification of the maturity of a 
technology.          
 
The term “allowables” is retained because it signaled the concerns of the engineers.         
“Allowables” refers to the design limits of a new technology. To jump ahead, they are 
about the conditions where the new technology will NOT work. 
This script clearly, refers to aspects of the technology itself and not to experts or 
the means used to convey knowledge to others. Conceptually, each of these scripts is 
quite different. One is about people, the second is about information, and the third is 
about the technology. The last quote captured the essence of the model. It was about the 
maturity of the technology. It should be noted that the first author’s engineering 
background allowed him to discover the script suggested by this last group of quotations. 
This third model was relabeled as the “maturity of technology model” to reflect its 
content more explicitly. 
 
Step 2: Defining the Models 
 
The next step in the process was for the researcher to invent definitions of each 
model. The model is not a scientific construct. It is a theory-in-use (Argyris & Schon, 
1978) by organizational members. While evidence will be offered that it may be 
generalizable to other organizations, it is not connected to academic organizational 
theories. The purpose of these definitions was to provide a basis for developing a set of 
assumptions that explicate each model. The definitions provide tentative formal meaning 
to the metaphorical labels that derived from the subjective analysis and coding of the 
interview data. 
The process of defining each model is iterative. A definition based on the 
interview data is ventured and its assumptions are made explicit. These assumptions are 
tested against the definitions and assumptions of competing models. Each definition is 
honed so that it is consistent with its own assumptions and opposed to those of competing 
models. This creates a dialectic structure where each model anchors an extreme position.         
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This structure, anchored by extreme conflicting models, creates a framework of 
understanding within which the interviewing team could make sense of their findings. 
We must emphasize that this structure represents a framework for thought, not 
action. Practical actors draw from all of these models without understanding their explicit 
content. The research goal was to make that content explicit, so that actors could more 
intelligently deal with the challenges of technology transfer. 
We begin with model definitions that emerged from the process. 
 
A. The people-mover model  
Technology transfer occurs when a person expert in an advanced 
technology is assigned to a program and produces outcomes in that 
program that utilize that technology.  
 
B.       The communication model  
Technology transfer is essentially a communication process 
affected through the documentation of research and development 
and dissemination through the media of documents, databases, 
seminars and presentations.  
 
The definition developed for the maturity of technology model demonstrates the 
iterative nature of the process. We cannot simply label and define a model. We must test 
it against the other models and for consistency with the interview data. We, first, 
ventured the following definition, 
 
C. The maturity of technology model – Tentative definition 
Technology transfer takes place when results, data, and 
specifications are sufficiently complete to allow a designer to 
apply the technology and such applications have occurred.  
 
Is it about the technology or the designer? If the R&D experts are the designers, 
the model collapses into the people-mover model. The dialectic requires a sharper 
differentiation. The definition did not carefully relate to the maturity of the technology.         
A second definition proved more explicit. The notion of maturity is anchored to the 
ability to utilize the technology. Even this definition is somewhat problematic because of 
the overlap with the communication model. However, as a basis for testing assumptions 
and counter-assumptions, it proved adequate. 
 
C2 The maturity of technology model 
Technology transfer takes place when a technology is mature and 
sufficiently complete knowledge has been communicated to designers and 
engineers to utilize that technology practically and effectively. 
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A possible fourth model 
 
A fourth script hinted at in the data argued that technologies are purchased from 
suppliers, and thereby developed for engineers and designers. Typical of the type of 
assertion indicative of this script was “It is more prudent to put risk for technology 
infusion on the shoulders of suppliers.” The problem with this model is that technology 
refers to knowledge that can be used predictably. Given this recognition, suppliers do not 
transfer technology: They simply provide hardware or related supplies. They may learn a 
new technology in producing their products, but their knowledge remains with them.         
This model was rarely mentioned in the interviews. Given the charter of the interviewers 
and the specific focus on technology transfer within the company, this model was not 
explored.           
Upon further reflection, exploration of this model might have yielded interesting 
results. Some managers appear to be too risk averse to engage the challenges of 
technology development and transfer. That suggests that another barrier to technology 
transfer is risk avoidance. It would have been difficult, given the paucity of responses, to 
explore this model. Moreover, the focus of the interviewing team may have suppressed 
the expression of risk avoidance. It may have been very significant, but that could not be 
inferred from the interview data. 
 
Step 3: Assumptions and Counter Assumptions 
 
The meaning of each model is further clarified by inferring the assumptions 
underpinning each model. In this qualitative methodology, researchers maintain relative 
freedom in developing their taxonomy from the interview data. The models become the 
objects of further conceptual inquiry. In seeking assumptions, researchers escape the 
limitations of the anecdotal data.          
This is, therefore, a creative and iterative process. The assumptions of each model 
are tested against competing models to reveal counter assumptions. These, in turn, force 
further clarification of the original assumptions. The purpose is to make salient the 
differences between models and sharply distinguish between them. Our interpretations of 
the assumptions and counter assumptions are displayed in Figures 1, 2, and 3. It should 
be clear that these lists are not exhaustive.          
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Figure 1. The people-mover model: Assumptions and counter assumptions. 
 
The People-Mover Model - Definition 
Technology transfer occurs when a person expert in an advanced technology is 
assigned to a program and produces outcomes in that program that utilize that technology 
 
Assumptions 
People-Mover Model Communications Model Maturity of Technology Model 
Assumptions Counter Assumptions Counter Assumptions 
Technology is 
knowledge in the mind 
of an expert 
Technology is the 
transfer of knowledge not 
people. 
Designers cannot use an 
immature technology. 
Advanced technologies 
cannot be transferred by 
other means. 
Advanced technologies 
can be documented 
sufficiently for 
application. 
Advanced technologies may 
not be mature enough for 
application. 
Technology transfer 
means producing 
components for projects. 
Transfer is evidenced by 
documentation, not time 
spent on a project. 
Expert learning is not 
equivalent to applications by 
designers. 
 
Figure 2. The communications model: Assumptions and counter assumptions. 
 
The Communication Model - Definition 
Technology transfer is essentially a communication process affected through the 
documentation of research and dissemination through the media of documents, data 
bases, seminars, and presentations. 
 
Assumptions 
Communication Model People-Mover Model Maturity of Technology Model 
Assumptions Counter Assumptions Counter Assumptions 
Technology at any level of 
development can be 
transferred. 
Researchers must apply a 
technology to document it 
for others. 
Immaturity makes a technology 
unusable for designers. 
Designers and engineers 
will apply technical 
information gained through 
information dissemination. 
Without researcher 
expertise, designers will not 
sufficiently understand that 
information. 
Technology transfer is a learning 
process accomplished by application 
of a technology. 
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Figure 3. The maturity of technology model: Assumptions and counter assumptions. 
 
The Maturity of Technology Model - Definition 
Technology transfer takes place when a technology is mature and sufficiently 
complete knowledge has been communicated to designers and engineers to utilize that 
technology practically and effectively. 
 
Assumptions 
Maturity of Technology Model People-Mover Model Communications Model 
Assumptions Counter Assumptions Counter Assumptions 
The core limitation is the maturity 
of the technology 
State-of-the-art technology 
is not transferable to the 
untalented. 
Where is the “shelf” if not in the 
documentation? 
A mature technology can be 
learned by a competent designer 
Too much of a new 
technology remains 
intuitive to the expert. 
Too little of the technology will 
have been documented. 
Application will be evident to 
designers. 
Application will be more 
evident to researchers 
Evidence of applicability needs 
to be documented 
Designers will pull them from the 
“shelf 
Only old technologies are 
“on-the-shelf.” 
How does a mature technology 
become known as “on-the-
shelf?” 
 
Step 4. Identify and Define Contradictions 
 
This process forces each model into its extreme interpretation further illuminating 
differences. Conflicting models suggest that effective technological transfer is necessarily 
a paradoxical process (Cameron, 1986). This suggests a hypothesis that goes beyond 
current DI practice. 
 
Given that each model has relevance and validity, and given that they are 
in conflict, then, necessarily, each model is limited and incomplete. It 
follows that each model is self-contradictory if pushed to an extreme.          
 
If each model grasps an essential truth, and each is in conflict with the others, 
then each model is necessarily incomplete. It follows that attempting to apply any of 
these models, while ignoring the others, will lead to failure.          
So clarified, the models developed through the DI process can better serve as a 
basis for parsing discussions on such broad concepts as technology transfer. More 
important, pushing each technology transfer model to the point of self-contradiction 
unambiguously establishes its meaning. This appears to liberate it from a host of other 
organizational variables creating a basis for generalizing each model to other 
organizational settings. We would expect all aerospace firms engaged in research to face 
similar technology transfer challenges. Research interpretations of contradictions inherent 
in each of the three models developed from DI analysis of the interview data follow.  
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People-mover model contradiction 
 
Clearly, experts moved to projects to develop applications increase their 
knowledge of a new technology, but do they transfer that knowledge to others?         
More likely, it remains with the expert. Thus, this model can collapse into a supplier 
model. Experts return to research facilities, and only project hardware and software 
remain after them. The interviews provided ample evidence for this outcome, for 
example, “We do not manage to capture our past knowledge and experience” and “Old 
boy’ contacts . . . will present difficulties when we lose older people.” In short, without a 
mechanism for teaching and learning, technology will not be transferred.  
The contradiction, then, of the people-mover model is: Simply employing the 
expert to solve a specific problem may assure that he or she learns more about a 
technology. Without provision for teaching and learning, the technology will not be 
available to others. 
 
The communications model contradiction 
 
The contradiction relates to the content of the knowledge required for effective 
technology transfer and to learning processes. Advanced technologies are necessarily 
incomplete and untried. We may know how they work. Without application, we are 
unlikely to know their design limits (i.e., the conditions when they will not work).   
Thus, it is what is unknown about an immature technology that may be more 
important than the known. The contradiction inherent in the communication model is: 
The expectation that researchers can document and communicate what they do not know. 
 
The maturity of technology model contradiction 
 
The primary contradiction is the process of putting a technology on-the-shelf.         
An immature technology must be applied to develop the design parameters and 
limitations of its utilization. The maturity of technology model requires exactly this 
information as a precondition for such applications. In effect, the model calls for 
technologies to be transferred before they will be applied; to “bootstrap” themselves. 
Therefore, the contradiction inherent in the maturity of technology model is: An 
immature technology must be applied to develop its design parameters and limitations.         
Yet, the model requires exactly such information as a condition for such applications. 
 
The Requirements for Effective Technology Transfer 
  
The three models suggest particular requirements for the successful transfer of 
technology from research and development to utilization in practical designs. 
 
• Experts knowledgeable in the technology must work with designers and 
engineers. 
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It is clear that too much of the knowledge in new technologies is implicit and untested 
for, to be utilized without expert direction and experience. 
 
• The new technology must be tested to establish its design limitations. 
 
The process of utilization creates the conditions for testing a new technology and 
discovering its design limits. Experts will learn from both designers and testing of new 
designs. Until design limits are verified, the new technology will be considered immature 
and problematic. 
 
• The process of application and testing must be sufficiently documented for the 
technology to be useable for other designers. 
 
It is not sufficient to successfully utilize a new technology in a particular application.         
It is necessary to document the design, the variables, and the nature of the tests. The 
technology will not have been transferred unless there is sufficient documentation to 
attest to its maturity and inform its utilization. 
 In effect, a technology will have been transferred when project engineers have 
mastered it well enough to teach it to others and do so, it is well enough documented so 
that others can learn it, and it has been applied and tested sufficiently for its limitations to 
be understood. 
 
Methodological Reflections 
 
Recognition of each of these tentative models was triggered by strong negative 
constraints on technology transfer. "We do not transfer technology, we get the expert."         
"They don't document." "It must be on the shelf." "We don't transfer technology, we 
purchase hardware." While the models seem self-evident from the data, they are, 
nevertheless, the interpretations of the researcher, not the subjects. "The laws of science 
may thus be descriptions of how the world looks… or prescriptions for how to look at the 
world. We really have no way of knowing which” (Weinberg, 1975, p. 203). The 
dialectic was imposed on the data as a prescription for discovery. To be valid as 
descriptions of technology transfer, their validity had to be tested. 
With the framework complete and appearing to encompass all of the interview 
data, and the cognitive maps implicit in the data stretched, to reveal competing 
perspectives, all of the data and analysis (enriched by many quotations from the 
management team interview notes) were presented to the management team, who had 
conducted the interviews. The presentation took over four hours and proceeded in exactly 
the order presented here. Much time was devoted to exemplifying the models and their 
assumptions with interview data. Given that the researchers’ interpretive processes 
moved them well beyond the interview data, it was necessary to test the validity of their 
models and assumptions. 
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Reality Checks – Internal Validity 
 
Once assumptions, counter assumptions, and contradictions are explicit, it is 
important to perform reality checks on the findings. Argyris and Schon (1978) have 
argued that subjects should test valid information. Weick (1989) sets some criteria for the 
validation of theories that are as appropriate for manager's theories as those of scientists.         
The foremost criterion is “plausibility.” This is especially important if the object of 
inquiry is sense-making enactments. Aubusson (2002) also argues that interpretations 
should be checked with those who have direct knowledge of the phenomena. 
 At the end of the presentation, two questions were asked of the management 
team. The first was a test of internal validity, “Do the findings conform to your 
experience of the practices of technology transfer in ABC and do they constitute a 
reasonable interpretation of the interview data?” 
The management team, of course, had conducted all of the interviews. They had 
access to all the company data, and constituted a panel of experts on technology transfer 
in the organization. The management team’s response was remarkably positive. It was 
asserted that the models represented the interviews well, albeit with different labels and 
images. Indeed, one member expressed his relief that someone had finally made sense of 
their findings. Furthermore, the management team found the models interesting and 
believable, two other criteria set by Weick.          
The following question was a test of internal validity, “How consistent were the 
results in representing the interview data?” Given the rich debates on the validity of 
qualitative findings (Winter, 2000), it is important to define what the researchers meant 
by validity. DI, in this research, was employed as a method of discovery, not 
measurement. Internal validity, in this case, meets the criteria suggested by Winter, in so 
far as it represents the meanings and experiences of individuals, and a group of 
knowledgeable professionals. The three models of technology transfer were an 
interesting, useful, believable, representation of the data gathered by a team of subject 
matter experts. It made sense to them. 
Internal validity does not imply an exclusive frame of reference. It is certainly 
possible that a set of alternative models might also demonstrate their validity and provide 
other insights into the complexities of technology transfer. 
 
Reality Checks – External Validity 
 
A more important test is external validity. Winter (2000) argues that external 
validity is not usually important to qualitative researchers. “Qualitative findings are best 
generalizable to the development of theories and not wider populations.” We disagree; 
external validity, as we define it, proved to be very important in this research. Given the 
characterization of technology transfer, in terms of ideal types of models, the models may 
be generalizable across many organizations. That is, the challenges represented by these 
models may be inherent in the field of advanced technological development, independent 
of particular organizations and their practices. They may be formulated differently if 
examined from a different perspective, but they cannot be avoided. 
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Distilled to their essentials and stripped of the accretions of particular 
organizational cultures and practices, ideal models should be valid for all large 
organizations faced with the challenges of technology transfer. It was important to test 
this conclusion leading to a second question. “Can any aerospace organizations of similar 
size and complexity escape the implications of the three models derived from the 
analysis?” 
The management team had rich industry experience, and had interacted with 
colleagues across the industry for many years. They were asked to reflect on whether 
these models were not inherent in the technology transfer enterprise, a valid 
characterization of technology transfer processes across many different firms. 
Note what is and is not implied by the question. The question does not suggest 
that other organizations conduct technology transfer efforts in a way similar to ABC. It 
does not specify particular practices. It asks whether the practices or understandings of 
other firms could be mapped on the basis of these models.  
Again, the management team concluded that the proposed models were valid.         
In their experience, and on the basis of their many contacts in the industry, they saw these 
models as reflecting industry wide issues. The models appeared “generic,” although 
many other such models might have been developed. 
External validity has particular organizational relevance. If the models are 
“generic,” they are not a function of personalities, local organizational cultures, 
structures, or management styles. Recall that these are the variables in most research on 
technology transfer. Most of the models discussed in the literature were developed as 
extensions of theories and models of organizational processes (Ettlie, 1988; March & 
Sproull, 1990; Rubenstein, 1992). Generic models should lead us to question much of this 
quantitative research on technology transfer. 
The recognition of generic challenges and models of technology transfer change 
the discourse within the organization. The issues are not leadership, personalities, culture, 
or organizational structure. They are inherent in the endeavor. Even if every unit is 
effective and competent, these challenges will remain. That creates an opportunity to 
collaborate across units rather than fight about responsibility for failure, and enables the 
organization to transcend disruptive conflict at least with respect to technology transfer 
issues.  
 
Synthesis 
 
Further reflection on the findings lead to a synthetic model for technology transfer 
that incorporates the requirements of each model elicited by DI. An effective process may 
be defined as:  
 
Technology transfer is a process where advanced and immature 
technologies, developed and understood by experts, become tested and 
documented bodies of knowledge accessible and usable by designers who 
have gained the competence to apply them effectively. 
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This process requires much more than meets the eye. Experts must be given 
opportunities to test out new technologies in practical applications. Those efforts must 
exceed the requirements of particular projects to discover the full range of design 
“allowables” and limitations. Parallel with this evolution of the technology, adequate 
documentation must take place to preserve knowledge gains. In addition, designers must 
be associated with the process in ways that allow them to gain competence as the 
practicality of the technology unfolds. A key aspect of the process is the shift in focus 
from knowledge to application, from experiment to product, and from research to design.          
The project concluded with a proposal for a technology transfer team 
organization, as an extension of a project team, charged with the dual goals of producing 
an item of required hardware and effecting technology transfer to the wider ABC 
organization. By linking the two goals, we can overcome a glaring deficiency of present 
technology transfer practice. Technology transfer appeared in the interviews as an 
incidental outcome of the regular work of researchers, designers, and managers (i.e., a 
goal to be achieved at no extra cost). The proposal recognized that technology transfer 
demanded specific efforts.  
ABC identified three projects involving technology transfer in a variety of 
aerospace operations. The authors could not be involved in these projects for security 
reasons. In addition to completing their projects, the teams were charged with transferring 
the new technology utilizing the synthetic model defined above. As is often the case in 
complex R&D endeavors, two of the team projects were terminated for reasons 
independent of the technology transfer agenda. The third team, according to a report, 
completed its work and was able to successfully transfer a new technology. That is, the 
project engineers were able to continue to apply the new technology on further projects.  
.  
Conclusions and Implications 
 
Our conclusions address two levels of concern, the research outcomes and 
Dialectical Inquiry as a qualitative research method. The research effort was successful. 
We were able to “explain” the management team’s interview data to them. We provided 
them with a classification framework with which to understand and evaluate the many 
organizational proposals to change, improve, and codify technology transfer processes 
across the organization. That was the management team’s charter and the ultimate 
purpose of our research. 
The issues did not go away as this was a widely dispersed, complex, aerospace 
company with research efforts distributed across the company. There were always 
proposals, programs, and other managerial and administrative efforts to improve 
technology transfer. The members of this Engineering Management Quality Improvement 
Team were able to classify such initiatives in terms of these models, and foresee their 
limitations and challenges. Given the classified nature of their projects, the researchers 
were not able to discover how widely the research results were disseminated. In an 
interview with one manager many years after the research, the results were still 
remembered and found useful in his management role.  
Confronted with rich, anecdotal, “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) constituted 
by multiple, implicit, frames used by organizational actors (Goffman, 1974), Dialectical 
Inquiry proved to be a useful qualitative method. It achieved one of the purposes of 
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ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1968), by making explicit the theories-in-use of a set of 
organizational actors. While the method imposes a structure to these theories, their 
content is distilled from the descriptions of respondents. We believe that our tests for 
validity are particularly appropriate for qualitative research. We took Kaplan’s (1964) 
admonition seriously that our data must be tested against the understandings of 
organizational actors. Organizational subject matter experts who were, competent 
technologists, validated our interpretations. External validity, which we saw as the 
generalizability of the findings, not the method, across the domain of technology 
development and transfer, was tested with the same group and validated. Clearly, more 
testing of the models would be necessary to increase confidence in both internal and 
external validity.          
We have not demonstrated the efficacy of DI in a wide range of settings. The 
research represents a special case among social and organizational settings. The work of 
the team was well specified. The focus was not on organizational interactions, but a 
particular process. While technology transfer is a complex endeavor, it is not “wickedly 
structured.” Wickedly structured problems are those where there is no agreement on 
goals or means (Mason & Mitroff, 1981). There is agreement on the goals of technology 
transfer. DI should work well even when dealing with wickedly structured situations.         
However, its efficacy in a wide range of applications remains to be demonstrated. 
We have demonstrated that the imposition of a dialectical form to qualitative 
inquiry deepens understanding of multiple perspectives. By allowing for concurrent 
competing perspectives, we can refine each perspective, its constructs and meanings, and 
the relationships between perspectives without blurring and over-generalizing their 
content; that is a source of validity. It raises important issues for quantitative methods. 
 
• Why do we assume that single constructs, however reliable, accurate, and 
repeatable their measurement may be, can characterize complex social 
universes?  
• Why do we believe that theories constituted by sets of such constructs can 
adequately encompass a complex organizational or social universe? 
 
In addition, Dialectical Inquiry suggests a similar set of questions for qualitative 
researchers. 
 
• Is the world to be researched constituted by multiple, paradoxical, 
competing processes? 
• Are participant perceptions, in that world, constituted by multiple, 
antithetical understandings? 
• If so, what methods of qualitative research can capture this world? 
 
Among the interviewees at ABC was a manager who clearly articulated all three 
models of technology transfer without any appreciation of their inconsistencies. He was a 
competent, rational actor capable of effective action in a complex, poorly understood 
world. There are many like him. After all, technology transfer has been going on 
successfully for millennia. 
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